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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
How has the prospect of European Union (EU) accession affected
LGBT-rights movements in the Western Balkans? Traditional analy-
ses focus on the legal effects of the accession process, in which coun-
tries adopt new laws in order to comply with the EU acquis. How-
ever, solely examining the legal effects of EU conditionality neglects
significant causative processes of social movement development. Op-
positional theory, developed by Conor O’Dwyer, expands the scope
of analysis of conditionality’s impact on social movements. Incor-
porating the political process model from social movement theory
(McAdam 1999), oppositional theory examines the effect of EU con-
ditionality on the political opportunity structure, issue framing, and
activist mobilization of LGBT-rights movements in EU candidate and
new member states. In contrast to traditional Europeanization theory,
which focuses on the legal effects stemming from the conditionality
of the EU accession process, oppositional theory expects that joining
the EU will also shape how issues are framed and how activists are
mobilized in candidate and new member states. This creates a more
holistic view of LGBT-rights activism. In O’Dwyer’s formulation of
oppositional theory, conditionality prompts backlash from anti-LGBT
activists, resulting in a counter-mobilization of pro-LGBT activists
and framing contests that are won by frames helpful to LGBT ac-
tivists, resulting in a more vibrant LGBT-rights movement. To test
3
introduction 4
this, I examine the development of LGBT-rights movements in Croa-
tia and Serbia to see if they are consistent with the predictions of
oppositional theory, and investigate if oppositional theory provides
a better explanation of the development of LGBT-rights movements
than basic Europeanization theory focusing solely on conditionality.
Ultimately, I seek to explain more fully how the EU accession pro-
cess affects candidate and potential candidate countries, as well as
uncover more about the mechanisms of activist development.
I hypothesize that the experience of Polish LGBT rights groups de-
scribed by O’Dwyer is reflected in similar experiences of Serbian and
Croatian LGBT rights groups after the breakup of Yugoslavia. In ad-
dition, I posit that the development of these groups in an oppositional
framework is distinct from how we would expect them to develop in
a framework based solely on the legal effects of conditionality. By
testing an expansion of basic Europeanization theory, and evaluating
it against the historical record, I contribute to the development of Eu-
ropeanization theory by either introducing valid alternative paths of
LGBT-rights movement and development, or by strengthening exist-
ing theories.
To test O’Dwyer (2012) on new case countries, I research the de-
velopment of LGBT-rights movements in Croatia and Serbia from the
breakup of Yugoslavia to the present day. These case studies focus
on the sociopolitical climate of the three countries, particularly as it
pertains to LGBT rights and EU accession. The case studies will in-
corporate scholarly material as well as newspaper articles, interviews,
and primary source documents.
My findings are two-part. First, I find that backlash from anti-LGBT
groups is the primary driver of the benefits of the EU accession process
for LGBT rights groups. This backlash impacts all three components
of the political process. Highly visible actions by anti-LGBT groups
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increases the importance of protection for LGBT rights and persons
in EU conditionality. Competition between mutually antagonistic dis-
courses around LGBT rights results in what O’Dwyer terms framing
contests. These contests, which are public and high-profile, increase
the salience of issues surrounding LGBT rights. The most visible
form of backlash comes from mobilization. Oppositional theory pre-
dicts that the EU accession process spurs a mobilization of anti-LGBT
activists, which in turn spurs a counter-mobilization of LGBT-rights
activists and activists that support EU accession if not LGBT rights
specifically.
Second, I find that the Serbian and Croatian cases reflect two diver-
gent scenarios predicted by oppositional theory. The first, in which
there is backlash to the EU accession process and LGBT-rights ac-
tivism benefits from the backlash, is consistent with the Serbian case.
The second, in which there is not significant backlash to the EU acces-
sion process, is consistent with the Croatian case. These predictions
are taken from O’Dwyer, who analyses the cases of Poland and the
Czech Republic. Neither Croatia nor the Czech Republic had the
same level of opposition to LGBT rights activism as Poland or Serbia,
and the LGBT-rights movement in the Czech Republic evaporated
shockingly quickly after the passage of a same-sex partnerships law
in 2006. It remains to be seen whether or not the same fate will befall
the Croatian LGBT-rights movement following the institution of most
rights for same-sex partnerships in 2014.
To begin my paper, I review literature on postcommunist civil soci-
ety and the effects of Europeanization on the political climate of can-
didate and potential candidate countries, as well as the elements of
social movement theory that are relevant in O’Dwyer’s model. These
will be the major theoretical jumping-off points for my argument.
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Next, I explain the theory behind O’Dwyer’s oppositional explana-
tion of LGBT-rights movement development. In explaining the rela-
tionship between EU linkage and LGBT-rights movement, I place or-
ganized opposition as the mediating force by which EU integration is
transformed into tangible benefits for LGBT activists. I then provide
an overview of the theoretical framework created by O’Dwyer (2012).
The model is a continuation of the ‘political process model’ from so-
cial movement theory (McAdam 1999; Sperling 1999). O’Dwyer uses
the three analytical concepts of political opportunity structure, issue
framing, and the activist network to form a model for a case study of
the Polish LGBT-rights movement. For this case study, I outline the
different political opportunity structures in the studied countries and
the framing process that occurred for activist networks. In particular,
I focus on the historical development and trends in the measures of
these analytical concepts.
Following the theoretical framework, I proceed into a case study of
the historical development of the LGBT-rights movement in each case
country, paying particular attention to the role of oppositional actors
and the EU. To facilitate analysis of the impact of the EU accession
process, I split each case study into periods corresponding to stages
of the accession process: pre-process, potential candidate, candidate
(for Croatia and Serbia), and EU member state (for Croatia).
I conclude by placing my analysis of O’Dwyer (2012) in the con-
text of Europeanization theory as a whole. DDoes oppositional the-
ory provide a more convincing account of the development of LGBT
rights in Croatia and Serbia than an analysis based strictly on EU con-
ditionality? Is the determining factor in the growth of LGBT-rights
movements backlash from anti-LGBT groups, as oppositional theory
predicts? To facilitate this analysis, I highlight illustrative sections of
the case studies – Croatia after accession, and Serbia in the late-2000s
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– that delineate the different predictions of the three theories, and the
historical record therein.
2
L I T E R AT U R E R E V I E W
In this section, I provide a brief review of the literature on two top-
ics essential to my thesis: the situation of social movements after the
fall of communism, and the process of Europeanization. The position
of social movements in post-communist countries sets the stage for
explanations of LGBT-rights movement growth, which both basic Eu-
ropeanization theory and oppositional theory seek to provide. When
describing the features of basic Europeanization theory, I note the
sections in which oppositional theory incorporates, expands upon, or
differs from basic Europeanization theory.
2.1 postcommunist social movements
The development of social movements in postcommunist societies has
been profoundly influenced by the nature of associational life under
Communist rule. During the Communist era, there was a distinct lack
of explicitly political organization due to the controlling nature of
the state. This paucity of political organization – particularly among
countries that were not part of the Visˇegrad states – manifested it-
self in a very weak outlook for politically-oriented social movements.
However, as these nations began to liberalize and democratize, there
was a marked increase in the presence of social movements and civil
society organizations. I begin by reviewing research describing the
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situation of social movements just after the fall of communism be-
fore covering research on civil society’s eventual development in the
post-communist sphere.
Many studies of civil society in post-communist countries have fo-
cused on the depressed numbers of third sector organizations in the
years after the fall of communism, often attributing such stunted de-
velopment to a ”Leninist legacy”. Ken Jowitt (1992) describes this
legacy as ”fragmented, mutually suspicious, societies with little religio-
cultural support for tolerant and individually self-reliant behavior.”
He claims that the social structure communist society propagated is
ill-suited to adapt to liberal democratic values due to a lack of em-
phasis on ”impersonal measured action”: the very sort of action that
occurs to support third sector organizations in democratic societies.
Marc Howard (2003) expands on the idea of a Leninist legacy. He pro-
vides empirical evidence that associational membership is lower in
post-communist societies than in older democracies or post-authoritarian
states, and provides potential explanations: mistrust of organizations
stemming from the Communist period, the strength of private net-
works, and disillusionment with the government and political sphere
in general. The idea of depressed civil society activity in postcommu-
nist countries interfaces with oppositional theory by providing con-
text as to the political climate for LGBT activists. The Leninist legacy
that Jowitt and Howard describe determines the political opportunity
structure (one of the three components of the political process model
used by oppositional theory) before postcommunist countries begin
attempting to join the EU.
Florian Bieber’s 2003 article details the role of Serbian NGOs in the
protest movement to overthrow the Milosevic regime in 2000. He de-
scribes repression of civil society in Serbia during the rule of Tito, and
its subsequent genesis and growth starting in the 1980s. A group of
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non-nationalist NGOs and civil society groups – which Bieber terms
”the other Serbia” – staged numerous (failed) protests against the
government throughout the 1990s. Bieber asserts that these efforts,
despite not succeeding, laid the groundwork for the ouster of Milo-
sevic. He concludes that ”this change (from unsuccessful protest to
successful) was not a sudden development, but rather was the result
of an often painful learning process.” Bieber’s article demonstrates
the fits and starts of Serbian civil society in the late 1990s, and the
slow process of building a strong third sector in Serbia.
Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik (2014) discuss conceptions of post-
communist civil society, and challenge three persistently-held beliefs.
They show that postcommunist civil societies were not constructed
out of nothing, but rather reflect systems of associational life present
during and before the communist regime. The second idea they chal-
lenge is that postcommunist civil society follows a different model
than existing models of civil society (cf. Scandinavia, the United
States, Latin America). Ekiert and Kubik reject this idea because,
in their view, postcommunist civil societies have not followed any
singular model of development or practice. They cite the vastly dif-
ferent appearance of civil society in the Visegrad states of Poland and
Hungary, as opposed to autocratic Central Asian republics such as
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Finally, Ekiert and Kubik challenge the
notion that postcommunist civil societies are uniformly weak. Not
every postcommunist country has a strong third sector, to be sure,
but many countries, especially those in Central Europe, have active
and dense networks of civil society actors.
In Beyond NGO-ization, Kerstin Jacobsson and Steven Saxonberg
(2013) collect articles to survey the development of social movements,
those institutionalized as NGOs and not, across Central and East-
ern Europe. The collection highlights specific civil society organiza-
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tions in the region that have had noteworthy trajectories, such as an-
imal rights activists in Poland and environmental activists in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. As the title of the volume indicates, it focuses on
groups and methods of civil society mobilization beyond the typi-
cal pattern of gradual NGO formation and lobbying. These essays
provide support for one of oppositional theory’s theoretical propo-
sitions: that non-traditional causes of activist mobilization do exist
in the postcommunist sphere. This is especially illustrated by Conor
O’Dwyer’s article in the volume.
Conor O’Dwyer’s article ”From NGOs to Naught: The Rise and
Fall of the Czech Gay Rights Movement,” included in the Jacobs-
son and Saxonberg collection, seeks to explain why the strong LGBT-
rights movement that existed in the Czech Republic prior to EU acces-
sion dissolved after the passage of a law legalizing same-sex domes-
tic partnerships. O’Dwyer identifies the lack of a strong anti-LGBT
opposition and backlash to the institution of LGBT rights as a key
difference between the case of the Czech Republic and the case of
Poland, and sets the two countries up as opposite studies of how
LGBT-rights movements develop during and after the EU accession
process. In the theory section, these two case studies will be used as
examples to demonstrate the structure of oppositional theory. When
evaluating whether or not the case studies in this thesis are consistent
with the predictions of oppositional theory, it is important to keep in
mind both the examples of Poland, where backlash strengthened the
LGBT-rights movement, and the Czech Republic, where the lack of
backlash resulted in a nonexistent LGBT-rights movement just a few
years after accession. If there is backlash from anti-LGBT groups in
the case studies, we would expect to find a correspondingly stronger
LGBT-rights movement, and if there is little to no backlash, a rela-
tively weak one.
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2.2 europeanization theory
In this section, I describe existing Europeanization theory, which pri-
marily focuses on the effects of EU conditionality. I do this to estab-
lish a basis for oppositional theory’s expansion of Europeanization
theory to include additional elements of the political process for so-
cial movements. Additionally, since in oppositional theory the politi-
cal opportunity structure is determined by conditionality during the
EU accession process, an understanding of the theory surrounding
conditionality is important to oppositional theory.
Ulrich Sedelmeier (2011) reviews the state of the literature on Eu-
ropeanization in new member and candidate states. He divides the
competing theoretical approaches into two schools of thought: ra-
tional institutionalism, with a focus on external incentives and cost-
benefit analysis, and constructivist institutionalism, based around
models of social learning and norm diffusion. Rational institution-
alism focuses on EU conditionality and its impact on candidate coun-
tries. According to Sedelmeier, the major international factors in de-
termining the impact of conditionality are the clarity and credibility
of EU demands–there must be a well-understood and realistic reward
for compliance, and a well-understood and realistic punishment for
non-compliance, in order for conditionality to be at its most effective.
Domestically, rational institutionalism applies an external incentives
model to measure the impact of conditionality on powerful domestic
actors. If adjustment costs are high, or there is a lack of domestic
allies supporting EU reforms, conditionality will be less effective. Ra-
tional institutionalism is contrasted with constructivist (or sociologi-
cal) institutionalism. The major international factor determining the
EU’s impact on new member and candidate countries in the construc-
tivist framework is the perceived legitimacy of EU demands; if the
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EU is able to make the accession process–more specifically, the pro-
cess of compliance with the acquis communautaire, the body of EU
law–seem legitimate, candidate countries will comply more promptly
and fully. Domestic identification or non-identification with the EU
is also an important part of the constructivist model, as citizens who
identify with the EU will be more likely to support Europeanization.
O’Dwyer (2012) draws from both rational and constructivist insti-
tutionalism, unifying particular insights into a cohesive framework
for oppositional theory. Oppositional theory’s treatment of the po-
litical opportunity structure for social movements is predominantly
rational in nature. It takes conditionality as the primary influence
on the political opportunity structure, just as rational institutional-
ism does for the whole impact of the EU accession process. Where
oppositional theory differs from rational institutionalism and aligns
more closely with constructivist Europeanization theories is in the
components of the political process model that are not determined
by conditionality: issue framing and activist mobilization. In op-
positional theory, frames of LGBT rights and LGBT activist groups
become associated with respective pro-EU frames and activists. Con-
sistent with constructivist institutionalism, oppositional theory posits
that the legitimacy of EU-provided frames and activism is transferred
to LGBT activism, providing significant benefits to LGBT-rights move-
ments during the EU accession process.
Milada Vachudova (2005) introduces the concepts of active leverage
and passive leverage to describe the impact of the EU on candidate
countries. Active leverage is the leverage exerted by conditionality
– not just the conditionality inherent in compliance with the acquis,
but also other non-negotiable elements of the accession process such
as the Copenhagen criteria and the threat of a veto from an existing
EU member. Unlike active leverage, passive leverage does not place
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any requirements on the candidate country to comply with EU reg-
ulations and norms; instead, it is a function of the benefits that EU
membership provides, such as access to the EU single market and a
say in EU decision-making. These concepts will be useful for concep-
tualizing the impact of the EU on LGBT activists. Traditional Euro-
peanization theory primarily concerns itself with the effect of active
leverage upon social movements; oppositional theory broadens the
scope of analysis to include the impact of passive leverage as well. In-
cidents such as the attendance of an EU commissioner at a local Pride
parade or the publication of a new EU anti-discrimination policy do
have a significant impact on local LGBT-rights movements – one that
is lost when only considering conditionality or active leverage as a
driver of change.
Maxime Forest (2006) writes about the development of women’s
NGOs in the Czech Republic and describes two relevant phenom-
ena dealing with the ”cognitive framing” of women’s rights organi-
zations during EU accession: the adoption by women’s NGOs of a
”conceptual and ideological package” inherited from international or-
ganizations, and a reconceptualization of the role of women’s NGOs
in society as legitimate social welfare organizations. These phenom-
ena are examples of benefits that civil society organizations receive
from EU accession that are not related to conditionality – crucially,
these women’s NGOs did not receive much in the way of material
support from the EU. Forest (2006) provides an important example of
identification of activist movements with the EU, a key component of
oppositional theory.
Cristina Parau (2009) examines civil society organizations in Ro-
mania during the final stages of Romania’s EU accession and traces
the process by which they formed. Civil society organizations grew
in number and strength during that time period, but not all of that
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growth can be attributed to the influence of EU conditionality. Parau
establishes three pathways through that enabled the empowerment
of domestic civil society in Romania: the influence of EU condition-
ality upon the Romanian Executive, transnational advocacy networks
that supported existing NGOs and augmented their ability to affect
change, and a constructivist component, in which government iden-
tification with the goals of civil society organizations and external
disapproval led to a friendlier environment for civil society in Roma-
nia. While Parau’s case study does not use the political process model
as a framework, there are nevertheless a couple of key comparisons
that can be drawn between the Romanian case and the Serbian and
Croatian cases presented in this thesis. As previously discussed, the
identification of common goals between activist movements and the
local government is an important step for activists to benefit from the
EU accession process in oppositional theory. Parau provides an exam-
ple of this phenomenon occurring – and working. The alternative (i.e.
not determined by conditionality) paths that Parau outlines demon-
strate the need for an expansion of basic Europeanization theory.
3
T H E O RY
In this section, I set out the structure and mechanisms of oppositional
theory. My purpose in doing this is so that it can then be applied to
the Serbian and Croatian cases studies to evaluate whether opposi-
tional theory has explanatory power.
The idea of oppositional theory is best understood through the
”political process” model of social movement development (McAdam
1999; Sperling 1999; Tarrow 1998). In this paper, I focus on three fea-
tures of the political process model to explain LGBT-rights movement
development: political opportunity structure, issue framing, and ac-
tivist networks. I adopt two adjustments made in O’Dwyer (2012)
to better fit the political process model with LGBT-rights movements:
namely, defining the political opportunity structure in terms of EU
conditionality and developing a framework to measure the size and
strength of activist networks. This section details the three compo-
nents of the political process model. For each component, I explain
what it entails theoretically, what oppositional theory predicts it will
look like in the case studies, and if it differs from the predictions of
traditional Europeanization theory.
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3.1 political opportunity structure
O’Dwyer (2012) cites two main factors that shape the political oppor-
tunity structure of Polish LGBT-rights activists: the legacy of com-
munism and political pressures from EU conditionality. Both of these
factors are also present in the Serbian and Croatian cases–accordingly,
I primarily examine the political opportunity structures in each can-
didate country through the lens of those two factors. In addition, I
consider the impact of homophobia in the case countries, both as a
remnant of communism and as an element of religious nationalism.
Much research has been done into the relative lack of civil society in
post-communist countries, which is attributed to a ”Leninist legacy”
of atomization and de-emphasis on civic participation (Curtis, Baer,
and Grabb 2001; Howard 2003; Kopecky and Mudde 2005). Most of
this research focuses on countries more firmly within the Soviet bloc
than Yugoslavia; however, a similar phenomenon of stunted associa-
tional membership occurred during Tito’s reign, with growth in civil
society groups not occurring in Yugoslav countries until the 1980s
in Slovenia, and the 1990s for the other former Yugoslav republics
(Stubbs 1996). The effects of the communist legacy upon the activity
and vibrancy of LGBT-rights movements in the case countries (and in-
deed, in all post-communist countries) are undoubtedly depressive.
In addition, the wars following the breakup of Yugoslavia resulted
in the election of many nationalist, conservative politicians and par-
ties in the region. In countries ruled by the hard right, LGBT persons
did not receive equitable treatment from the government. No legal
protections for LGBT persons were in place, and with a regime hos-
tile to both civil society organizations that opposed the government
and to LGBT people, any supposed activism would have resulted
in the organizers being put swiftly in jail. The negative climate for
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LGBT persons in post-breakup former Yugoslav nations, combined
with the ”Leninist legacy” in postcommunist countries described by
Jowitt (1992) and Howard (2003) and the accounting of Serbian civil
society in Bieber (2003), leads to the conclusion that the political climate
for potential LGBT activists in Serbia and Croatia before the advent of the
EU accession process was resoundingly unfavorable.
In contrast, the impact of the EU accession process and the polit-
ical pressure applied therein by conditionality has a more complex
impact on the political opportunity structure. Following O’Dwyer
(2012), I examine conditionality as a force that shapes the political
opportunity structure of social movements, rather than solely as a
method of creating external incentives or promoting social learning
(Sedelmeier 2011). To do this, I split the development of the case
countries’ EU candidacies into stages according to their status as EU
candidates. For Serbia these stages would be: 1990-2000, from the
founding of the first LGBT activist group in Serbia to the fall of the
Milosevic regime, and a time when there was little to no suggestion of
Serbia joining the EU; 2000-2010, during which the concept of a ”Eu-
ropean Serbia” was formed and which concludes with the signing
of a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU; and 2010-
2015, during which Serbia became an official EU candidate and the
march towards accession proceeded in full force. For Croatia: 1995-
2001, the period before Croatia signed a Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA) with the EU; 2001-2005, when Croatia is a poten-
tial candidate country; 2005-2013, Croatia being an official candidate
country; and 2013-2015, Croatia as an official EU member.
The final factor affecting the political opportunity structure of LGBT
groups in the case countries is one that is specific to LGBT advo-
cacy. The discourse towards LGBT activism in Serbian politics is
profoundly nationalist and homophobic, which harms the ability of
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LGBT advocates to legitimize activism. The Serbian ”national iden-
tity”, as conceived of by far-rightwing parties, consists of a strong
masculine character and allegiance to the Serbian Orthodox Church
(Dzombic 2014; Greenberg 2006). LGBT activism is seen as a threat
to Serbian masculinity, and any suggestion of homosexual activity is
met with homophobia–even when discussing male rape victims from
the wars with Croatia (Zˇarkov 2007). The Serbian Orthodox Church
further promotes homophobia in Serbian society; the official stance
of the church is strongly against any legitimization of homosexuality,
and other Orthodox churches in Romania and Russia have pushed
for the criminalization of homosexuality. In particular, Serbian Or-
thodox bishops objected to a 2009 anti-discrimination law, preventing
its passage, primarily because its Article 21 prohibited discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity (Stakic 2011).
Since oppositional theory defines the political opportunity struc-
ture for LGBT-rights movements partly through conditionality, I ex-
pect that conditionality will exert change on the politics of the case
countries. While this is not a particularly unreasonable criterion for
conditionality given the nature of the EU accession process, it is nec-
essary to establish the framework for oppositional theory as a whole.
Because oppositional theory presents a re-conceptualization of con-
ditionality as defining political opportunity structures, rather than
ignoring it, the predictions of oppositional theory and traditional Eu-
ropeanization theory regarding political opportunity structures in the
case countries diverge little in result. Both predict that LGBT rights
and protections will strengthen as the case countries proceed in the
EU accession process; however, traditional Europeanization theory
takes EU conditionality to be the sole effect of the EU accession pro-
cess on LGBT rights development. Oppositional theory incorporates
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additional elements of the political process model, which will be de-
tailed in the next two sections.
3.2 issue framing
One of the major ancillary impacts of the EU accession process is
that it provides a powerful new frame for political actors in the can-
didate country. From opposition parties to social networks, groups
are able to shape their message and policies around the requirements
of the EU accession process (Vachudova 2005; Cisar and Vrablikova
2010). For LGBT-rights movements in particular, the frame that the
EU accession process provides is one based around legal rights and
representation for all persons. This positive frame contrasts with the
existing frame, which in postcommunist countries is usually negative
due to resistant homophobia. That contrast sets up framing contests,
in which the EU-provided frame competes with the existing frame
for legitimacy in the public eye1. O’Dwyer (2012) theorizes that these
framing contests are positive events for LGBT rights activists because
the EU-provided frame is likely to win (given the popularity of EU ac-
cession as an idea, the legitimacy of the EU as a body, etc.) and also
because the framing contests are usually high-profile media events
that provide visibility to activists.
3.3 activist networks
O’Dwyer (2012) provides three criteria for studying the activist net-
works of LGBT-rights movements and their opposition: density, co-
ordination, and capacity. Density refers to the overall size of the
1 Talk given by Conor O’Dwyer at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
2014.
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movements, both in terms of number of organizations and the ser-
vices provided by those organizations, e.g. legal assistance. Coordina-
tion is the ability of groups to cooperate–by limiting inter-movement
conflict, not overly competing with each other, and organizing to-
gether for large-scale public events, such as Pride parades or counter-
demonstrations. Finally, capacity refers to the ability of these groups
to influence political action, such as by lobbying politicians or even
just by labeling LGBT activism as political, something that was seen
as taboo in Poland the early post-communist era.
According to oppositional theory, the accession process should spark
an anti-LGBT rights backlash from opposition forces in the case coun-
tries. During this backlash, opposition groups should grow in one
or more of the three criteria listed above. That backlash then should
result in a counter-mobilization by LGBT rights supporters, during
which LGBT activist networks grow in one or more of O’Dwyer’s
criteria for measuring activist networks.
4
S E R B I A
In this section, I trace the development of the LGBT-rights movement
in Serbia from its genesis in the early 1990s up to the present day. I
divide my research into three periods: 1990-2000, when Serbia is a
non-candidate country for EU accession; 2000-2010, when Serbia be-
comes a potential EU candidate country; and 2010-2015, when Serbia
achieves official candidate status. In each period, I will detail the sta-
tus of the three components of the political process model: political
opportunity structure, issue framing, and activist mobilization.
4.1 1990-2000 : negative climate
In the absence of EU conditionality, the major factors determining
the political opportunity structure for LGBT activists in Serbia in this
time period were the orientation of the Milosevic government away
from the EU and the weakness of anti-Milosevic opposition parties
and civil society groups. Without a government or opposition that
was able to lend political legitimacy to LGBT activists, there was very
little support for any sort of campaign that would go against Serbian
national values. By ”Serbian national values,” I mean a linkage of
political conservatism, nationalism, and homophobia that conspired
to elect post-war leaders that were stridently opposed to any form of
22
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legal rights or representation for LGBT persons (Drezgic´ 2010; Green-
berg 2006; Zivkovic 2006). The other major influences on the devel-
opment of LGBT activism in the time period were the social taboos
on homosexuality and being openly gay. These were partially due
to the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church on Serbian society,
but also the idea of a Serbian masculine character, which homosexu-
ality detracted from. I will briefly detail these taboos and how they
affected the framing of the issue of LGBT rights. These social taboos
severely limited membership in Arkadija and Labris, the two LGBT
activist groups that existed during the time period, as well as limiting
public discussion or acceptance of homosexuality. With a lack of do-
mestic advocacy networks to lay groundwork, transnational advocacy
networks1 were non-existent in Serbia during this time period.
Under the Milosevic government, Serbia made no attempt to join
the EU, nor to democratize. Lack of desire to join the EU meant that
there would be no pressure to grant Serbian citizens additional rights
exerted on the government by conditionality. As O’Dwyer notes, the
absence of EU conditionality in Poland from 1989-1997 helped create
a political opportunity structure that was also unfavorable to LGBT
activism. This effect was increased in Serbia by the rejection of democ-
racy and embrace of right-wing, homophobic extremism by the Milo-
sevic regime. Without Serbia being even nominally a democracy, the
diffusion of democratic norms from Western European nations was
not possible. The undemocratic nature of the Milosevic government
also affected the ability of LGBT rights activists to frame the issue of
LGBT rights in terms of ”political rights”, as will be discussed later.
In addition to a government that did not provide protections for mi-
nority rights, the political opportunity structure during the Milosevic
years also did not contain political parties or civil society organiza-
1 See Keck, Sikkink, and Sikkink (1998) for a definition of transnational advocacy
networks. Parau (2009) gives an example of their function in a similar case.
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tions that were effective advocates for LGBT rights. Anti-Milosevic
opposition political parties were plagued by fragmentation and co-
optation by the regime, particularly over nationalist policies (Bieber
2003). The opposition was leery of being painted as insufficiently
nationalistic, and so could not express support for something as so
contrary to the Serbian character as LGBT rights (Greenberg 2006;
Stakic 2011; Zivkovic 2006). What civil society groups were active in
anti-regime protest also were not concerned with promoting LGBT
rights; protests focused on electoral fraud and other anti-democratic
elements of the Milosevic regime(Bieber 2003).
The framing of the issue of LGBT rights in Serbia during this time
period was marked by the influence of the idea of Serbian masculin-
ity and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Serbian masculinity was tied
to the national identity of Serbia and linked with Serbian national-
ism. Part of the core of this masculinity was homophobia and anti-
gay sentiment; homosexuality was seen as damaging to Serbia’s na-
tional character (Evans and Cook 2014; Greenberg 2006; Zivkovic
2006). This manifested itself in homophobia among the nationalist
Milosevic government and opposition parties that sought to portray
themselves as defenders of the Serbian nation. I term the framing
of homosexuality as something contrary to the essence of Serbia as
”disorder” framing.
The second component of LGBT rights framing in Milosevic-era
Serbia deals with the Serbian Orthodox Church and its doctrinal treat-
ment of homosexuality. In 1984, the Orthodox Church released a
‘Statement on Homosexuality’ that stated the Church did not support
any attempt to grant LGBT persons equal rights. The statement delin-
eated two different types of homosexuality: that derived from physi-
cal or genetic abnormality, and that derived from moral failing. The
recommended treatment for each is medical and/or psychiatric treat-
4.1 1990-2000 : negative climate 25
ment, denoting homosexuality as an illness. Isidora Stakic (2011) de-
scribes how church doctrine influenced social attitudes by establish-
ing a conception of normality, which homosexuality falls outside of.
The establishment of homosexuality by the Serbian Orthodox Church
as an illness and something to be treated contributed to the creation
of the ”illness/disorder” framing of LGBT rights.
To illustrate my conceptualization of the ”illness/disorder” fram-
ing of LGBT rights in Serbia, I present an account of the treatment of
HIV/AIDS in Serbia during the time period. The Serbian populace
and medical system was unwilling to provide adequate support to
properly treat AIDS patients. According to Bojan Aleksov, an activist
for Arkadija,
There are no associations, organizations or groups in Ser-
bia today which are working with AIDS, giving informa-
tion about the disease and about the ways of prevention.
There are no forms of supporting or counseling for HIV
positive or AIDS diseased people. There are no humani-
tarian foundations which would provide financial aid to
them, no real hospitals to treat them, no public educa-
tional programs on AIDS.2
In 1994, only one ward of one hospital in the entire country–Ward
No. 6 in Belgrade’s Infectious and Tropical Disease Clinic–treated
AIDS patients. The conditions could not have been worse if it were
set in Chekhov’s Ward No. 6: patients were stuffed into rooms with-
out plumbing, windows, or light bulbs. The phone in the ward did
not work because workmen refused to enter the ward to come repair
it. Aleksov summed the conditions up by saying ”practically, you
are sentenced to death, laying in the box helpless – waiting.” The ac-
count of the abysmal treatment of HIV/AIDS patients in Serbia as
2 Interview included in Todosijevic 1995.
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compared to Poland distinguishes the ”illness/disorder” framework
I present from the ”charity/morality” framework present in O’Dwyer
(2012).
Domestic activist networks in Serbia during the 1990s were severely
limited by the social taboos against homosexuality. Arkadija and
Labris had difficulty attracting people who were willing to publicly
join an LGBT rights group, and the group itself did not openly lobby
for LGBT rights for fear of being painted as ”outsiders” or trouble
(Todosijevic 1995). It was not common for Serbian citizens to lobby
the government, partially due to the weakness of Serbian civil society
during the time period. Jelica Todosijevic (1995) relates that when
male homosexuality was decriminalized in 1994, it came as a shock
to Arkadija members and the rest of the Serbian gay and lesbian
community, who had not been promoting the legislation. Employ-
ment discrimination and street harassment were also common ways
of enforcing the social taboos. Domestic activist networks would not
begin to grow in Serbia until the beginning of the EU accession pro-
cess, which challenged the ”illness/disorder” frame and created a
safe space for LGBT advocates to work.
4.2 2000-2010 : developing ”european serbia”
On October 5, 2000, the Milosevic government was overthrown, and a
new era in Serbian politics began. The political opportunity structure
during this time period was defined by a reorientation towards Eu-
rope by mainstream Serbian politicians. The increasing prominence
of the EU in Serbian politics and the EU’s insistence on legal rights for
LGBT people challenged the ”illness/disorder” framing of the previ-
ous time period, and allowed LGBT activists a safer and stronger
way to promote their cause. Activist networks among opponents of
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LGBT rights grew due to the increasing linkage between the Serbian
Orthodox Church and rightwing political groups. Domestic LGBT ad-
vocacy networks also grew amid a more welcoming environment and
began to establish connections with LGBT rights groups in Western
countries.
The movement to overthrow Milosevic was explicitly a pro-democracy
movement. Spurred by student protests and democratic opposition
parties, the overthrow movement succeded in electing Zoran Djind-
jic as Serbia’s first post-communist Prime Minister in 2001. Dindic
was a committed democrat who oversaw increasing integration with
Europe, beginning the process of developing the concept of a ”Euro-
pean Serbia”3. By overthrowing the Milosevic government, the Ser-
bian people chose to ”enter Europe and accept European values”, ac-
cording to Ivica Dacic4. Political discourse in Serbia during the time
period focused around the idea of adopting European standards and
further integration with the rest of Europe. These ideas held a strik-
ing resemblance to the Polish slogan of a ”return to Europe” after
1989. Marek Mikus (2011) discusses the ”hegemonic nature” of this
discourse and emphasizes how the EU was portrayed as an exam-
ple of ”normality”. The latter point is particularly important in the
framing of LGBT rights issues during the time period.
During this period, we would expect to see conditionality begin to
affect the political opportunity structure for LGBT activists in Serbia.
However, despite the overall emphasis on making Serbia more like
a typical European country, initially there was not much improve-
ment in legal rights for LGBT persons in Serbia. This was due to the
absence of any binding conditionality on the part of the EU. While ”re-
spect for and the protection of minorities” are included in the Copen-
3 Laura Silber, ”Serbia Loses More Than a Leader,” New York Times, Mar. 14, 2003.
4 Cited in Mikus (2011)
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hagen criteria as pre-requisites for joining the EU5, sexual minorities
have not always been included in that requirement. It would not be
until the 2010s that the EU would foreground LGBT rights as an ac-
cession criterium and make it clear that legal protections for LGBT
citizens are a requirement for Serbian accession. Lack of EU con-
ditionality meant that increased rights for LGBT persons were not
established as an inextricable part of creating a ”European Serbia”.
That is to say, there was not a consideration that further European in-
tegration would necessarily mean further expansion of LGBT rights.
As the idea of EU accession gained traction in Serbian politics, LGBT
rights began to be expanded, culminating in the passage of a compre-
hensive anti-discrimination law in 2009.
The advent of a political desire to see Serbia join the EU changed
the framing of LGBT rights by placing the question of increased po-
litical rights for LGBT persons in the context of the ”European Ser-
bia” debate. Instead of being forced to conceptualize LGBT advo-
cacy as working against Serbian nationalism, activists could present
LGBT advocacy as moving Serbia towards Europe. This frame pre-
sented two differing visions of Serbia: on the one hand, a ”Euro-
pean Serbia” that followed the lead of post-communist countries in
Central Europe and restructured itself to prepare for potential EU
accession; the other a ”traditionalist Serbia” based around Orthodox
religious nationalism, and conservative politics and social attitudes.
These differing visions for Serbia correspond to the debate between
Poland A and Poland B during the early 2000s in Poland (O’Dwyer
2012; Zubrzycki 2006. These two visions of the future continued to
clash throughout the time period–and do even in the present day–
however, the establishment of a ”political rights” counter-frame to
5 ”Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria),” http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/
glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague.html.
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the ”illness/disorder” frame that predominated in the 1990s allowed
a space for LGBT activist groups to develop.
The linkage of the Serbian Orthodox Church and right-wing Ser-
bian political parties after the fall of Milosevic was clearly demon-
strated less than a year into the new era of Serbian politics. During
the 2001 Belgrade Pride Parade, Orthodox priests joined forces with
right-wing political leaders and hooligans to promote the disruption
of the parade, which eventually led to the dissolution of the parade
and widespread violence against the marchers. This is a paradigmatic
example of backlash from anti-LGBT groups, that – according to op-
positional theory – should result in a stronger Serbian LGBT-rights
movement later in the accession process or after accession. That De-
cember, the Church would hold a youth conference at the University
of Belgrade. Student and Church officials told attendees about the
need to protect the Serbian state by ”retraditionalization” and con-
demned liberal groups for advocating LGBT marriage rights (Ramet
2005). Another significant event for the political power of the Ortho-
dox Church in 2001 was the introduction of religious instruction in
public schools. This granted the Church extraordinary power to con-
trol political messages and made them a valuable partner. Religious
instruction in public schools also played a vital role in establishing
the ”religious nationalism” the Church sought to promote (Drezgic´
2010). In this formulation, Orthodox Christianity is one of the pillars
of the Serbian nation, along with Serbian ethnicity and masculinity.
As O’Dwyer’s theory predicts, growth in domestic activist net-
works among LGBT rights advocates during the 2000s was much
stronger than in the 1990s due to a society that was more open to
LGBT activism and the existence of a positive ”rights” frame for ac-
tivists to place their advocacy in. The post-Milosevic ODS-led gov-
ernment was much more open to civil society action than the prior
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regime. From 2000-2003, the Freedom House score for Serbian civil
society fell from 5.25 to 2.75, where it remained for the rest of the
2000s. While still not an ideal environment for NGO development–a
law revising the Milosevic-era civil society restrictions was not passed
until 2009–Serbia saw a dramatic increase in the health of its civil
society sector after 20006. In terms of LGBT civil society organiza-
tions specifically, there was tremendous growth in the number and
strength of NGOs focusing on LGBT issues. Influential groups such
as the Gay Straight Alliance and Queeria Center (which would be
the two groups sponsoring the later Belgrade Pride parades) were
founded in this time period. Additionally, groups such as LGBT
Vojvodina and Lambda spread LGBT activism outside of Belgrade,
where it previously had mostly been confined. These new LGBT
NGOs also had a more explicitly political bent than Arkadija or Labris.
Whereas the prior organizations focused on all aspects of support for
LGBT people, including awareness campaigns and HIV/AIDS pre-
vention, newer NGOs could focus solely on political activism. The
Gay Straight Alliance was established in 2005 in response to Novi
Sad police attempting to gather the personal information of LGBT
persons, and states their mission as ”focus[ing] on activities which
are primarily lobbying and advocating the rights of LGBT persons7.”
Increased political openness to civil society activism and the ability to
place LGBT activism within a political rights framework led to strong
growth in domestic advocacy networks in Serbia during the time pe-
riod. However, backlash against public demonstrations of LGBT ac-
tivism continued;
6 Freedom House. 2009. Nations in Transit 2009 (Serbia). https://freedomhouse.
org/report/nations-transit/2009/serbia.VImGsqTF8cE.
7 ”History of the Gay Straight Alliance,” http://en.gsa.org.rs/about-us/history/
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4.3 2010-2015 : the advent of conditionality
The signing of Serbia’s Stabilization and Association Agreement on
December 22, 2009 marked a significant change in the dynamic of
LGBT activism in Serbia: the beginning of binding EU conditionality.
Whereas before Serbian politicians were influenced to make improve-
ments in Serbia’s anti-discrimination laws by the prospect of entering
the official accession pathway–what Vachudova (2005) terms ”passive
leverage”–the conditionality contingent in the accession process now
exerted active leverage on politicians to comply with EU regulations
on LGBT rights. Consistent with oppositional theory, conditionality
affected the political opportunity structure for LGBT activists by in-
creasing politicians’ willingness to support measures necessary for
the accession process.
In 2012, the European Commission affirmed in a note that respect
for the rights of LGBT persons is an essential part of EU member-
ship, and that all potential new members of the EU must comply
with European human rights standards. Importantly, this note cod-
ified that Serbia would have to improve its LGBT rights record–or
appear to–in order to reach its goal of EU membership – something
that had not been taken for granted in the early stages of Serbia’s
accession process. Conditionality has improved and will continue to
improve LGBT legal rights in Serbia by setting goals for the govern-
ment to accomplish on the road to accession. The annual European
Commission Progress Reports for Serbia emphasize this. While not-
ing progress, the reports point out steps that Serbia must still take
to satisfy European human rights standards. In particular, the 2013
report notes that the UN Human Rights Council made 77 recommen-
dations pertaining to the protection of the rights of LGBT persons in
Serbia to be ratified by 2016. These reports also allowed LGBT ad-
4.4 summary 32
vocacy groups the ability to lobby the government based around EU
reports. Lazar Pavlovic´, the president of Gay Straight Alliance during
the 2010 Belgrade Pride Parade, said:
We used very consciously the fact that Serbia finds itself
in the process of EU integration, that the Progress Report
of the European Commission was going to be important,
that in the meetings with high state officials which they
had during 2010, one of the really important subjects was
precisely the Pride Parade8.
In putting together the progress reports for Serbia, EU analysts
would also consult with NGO leaders, allowing another way for LGBT
advocates to influence government policy through conditionality. The
binding nature of conditionality and the asymmetric nature of EU ac-
cession changed the political opportunity structure for LGBT groups,
allowing them to effect changes in Serbia’s human rights law.
4.4 summary
The development of the Serbian LGBT-rights movement is consistent
with that predicted by oppositional theory. The political opportunity
structure for LGBT-rights activists during the EU accession process
was, on the whole, determined by EU conditionality. The portions
of the case study where conditionality did not affect the political op-
portunity structure were before the beginning of the EU accession
process – where it would not be expected to have leverage anyway
– and in the early stages of the accession process, when it was not
clear that LGBT rights were a prerequisite for Serbia’s accession to
the EU. Backlash related to the EU accession process led to a re-
8 Cited in Mikus (2011)
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framing of how LGBT rights were presented in Serbian public dis-
course. The clash between frames of ”illness” and ”human rights”
took the form of public framing contests that raised the salience of
LGBT rights and ultimately determined the primacy of EU-supported
”rights” frames. The positive frames were supported by the narrative
of a ”European Serbia” that developed in the mid-2000s, showing
how pro-EU accession efforts also promoted LGBT rights. Finally,
backlash to the EU and its promotion of LGBT rights sparked anti-
LGBT rights demonstrations and violence. That backlash in turn
spurred a counter-mobilization of LGBT rights activists with EU sup-
port, as in 2014 Belgrade Pride.
5
C R O AT I A
In this section, I trace the development of the Croatian LGBT-rights
movement through Croatia’s EU accession process, focusing in par-
ticular on the three components of oppositional theory: political op-
portunity structure, issue framing, and activist mobilization. I divide
the case study into four time periods, roughly corresponding to Croa-
tia’s position in the EU accession process: 1991-2000, when EU acces-
sion was not a political possibility in Croatia; 2000-2005, after the fall
from power of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and ascension
of a center-left coalition, and during which Croatia became a poten-
tial candidate country; 2005-2013, the years between the adoption of
a Stabilization and Association Agreement between Croatia and the
EU and Croatian accession to the EU; and 2013-2015, after Croatia’s
accession to the EU.
5.1 1992-2000 : war and reproduction
The political opportunity structure for LGBT activists in Croatia – the
few that existed – following the breakup of Yugoslavia was domi-
nated in the early part of the 1990s by the war between Serbia and
Croatia and in the latter half by the right-wing governing coalition
led by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). The war essentially
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halted politics and political activism in Croatia, halting the develop-
ment of nascent gay and lesbian groups in Croatia, the latter as part
of the larger feminist/women’s movement in the former Yugoslavia
(Sagasta 2001). During the war, HDZ assumed power, led by Franjo
Tudjman, and would maintain control of the Croatian government
for the rest of the 1990s. A self-described conservative party, HDZ’s
main ideology was nationalistic, and an important part of the Croa-
tian national identity, especially during the war, was built around a
very macho, masculine national character (Zˇarkov 2007). As a result,
the post-war HDZ government was not exactly eager to institute le-
gal protections for LGBT Croatians (homosexuality had already been
decriminalized, in 1977). In this era in Croatian history, EU accession
was not the faintest political possibility, and thus conditionality held
no sway over the political opportunity structure, which was almost
uniformly negative for LGBT activists. In 1997, the Croatian govern-
ment passed a law that required NGOs to register with the govern-
ment to be eligible to receive government funding, which was widely
seen as a way for the government to monitor opposition groups (But-
terfield 2013; Stubbs and Zrinsˇcˇak 2006, 2009). Only one LGBT rights
group, Lesbian and Gay Men Action Zagreb (LIGMA), registered un-
der the law while HDZ held power, and even then government offi-
cials denied LIGMA the ability to use public offices or demonstrate
publicly (Sagasta 2001). The actions of the conservative HDZ govern-
ment, unconstrained by EU pressure, created an unfavorable political
climate for LGBT activists.
The impact of the Croatian war with Serbia on the Croatian na-
tional consciousness was to create a focus on reproduction and re-
building the Croatian state, which resulted in negative frames for
LGBT rights. Sagasta (2001) writes about how sexual violence in the
war – widespread instances of civilian rape on both sides – nearly
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obliterated the Croatian women’s movement, which housed Croatia’s
lesbian organizations as well. After the war, the public perception
of the proper role of women became focused on reproduction and
re-population to replace those who had been lost in the fighting, cre-
ating a negative social environment for lesbians. Gay men were also
negatively affected by the focus on reproduction and breeding in the
post-war period. In addition, the prevalence of male rape of Croats by
Serbs in the war fanned anti-male-homosexuality prejudices in Croat-
ian society (Zˇarkov 2007). Frames toward LGBT rights were, without
exception, negative during the rule of HDZ.
While there were a number of LGBT groups active during the 1990s,
almost all were not officially registered with the government due to
fear of harassment. The exception, LIGMA, folded in 1997 due to
negative press and lack of support from its official status (Sagasta
2001). A splinter group from LIGMA, Info-AIDS, provided the first
24-hour hotline to help HIV-positive Croatians, but soon folded as
well. Groups that were not officially registered did not find more suc-
cess, however. Lesbian Group Kontra was a Zagreb group founded
in 1997, but it is the only extant LGBT group to have been founded
before 2000. Simply put, there was very little motivation or opportu-
nity for LGBT rights groups to form in the 1990s, and thus there was
little activist mobilization.
5.2 2000-2005 : potential candidate
The death of President Tudjman in December 1999, followed by HDZ’s
resounding defeat in the 2000 parliamentary election, signaled a new
era in Croatian politics. A center-left coalition of the Social Demo-
cratic Party of Croatia (HDZ) and the Croatian Social Liberal Party
(HSLS) assumed power with a two-thirds majority, allowing them
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to amend the Croatian constitution. Sensing a more felicitious po-
litical climate, many LGBT groups formed and officially registered
with the government (Butterfield 2013). Among them were Lesbian
Group Kontra, Iskorak (the largest group in Croatia currently), and
LORI (the first NGO to officially register). Many of these new NGOs
received support from the federal government or their local govern-
ments – LORI in particular received the use of an office building in
Rijeka, where it was founded (Sagasta 2001). As these groups es-
tablished a friendlier relationship with the government, in turn they
began to professionalize and form lobbying efforts, a process detailed
in Butterfield (2013). In particular, Iskorak and Lesbian Group Kon-
tra collaborated on the Team for Legal Changes, which is an NGO
focused on lobbying the Croatian government for legal protections
for LGBT persons. This was a professional organization with consis-
tent membership that met with MPs and Croatian officials like other
NGOs. In 2003, LGBT activists won a major success with the pas-
sage of the Same-Sex Partnership Act, which allowed for (a very lim-
ited version of) officially recognized same-sex partnerships in Croa-
tia. While these partnerships only afforded same-sex couples 2 of
the 27 rights afforded to heterosexual couples, it was still seen as
a major political victory for LGBT activists. Aida Bagic and Vesna
Kesic (2006) note that the political reasoning for the passage of the
Same-Sex Partnership Act was a combination of a desire to have laws
in line with EU standards on LGBT rights, and fervent lobbying by
LGBT activists. The EU influence here was not conditionality in its
most technical form, as Croatia was not an official candidate for ac-
cession yet. However, there was a strong desire, both in the Croatian
government and the Croatian populace, for Croatia to become an EU
candidate (Vasilev 2016). The EU influence in this case can thus be
conceptualized as “passive leverage” from Vachudova (2005), who
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described how political parties in potential candidate states adjusted
their platforms to what they saw as “European policies”.
In the first half of the 2000s, frames around LGBT rights changed
slightly, dropping the emphasis on reproduction that was a remnant
of the war with Serbia and showing small signs of an effective frame
based around legal rights. Ivana Jugovic, Aleksandra Pikic, and
Natasa Bokan (2006) report that “public discussions have not shown
any awareness of the vulnerability sexual minorities face and the
need for their legal protection.” They describe the stigmatized po-
sition of LGBT individuals within mid-2000s Croatian society, as well
as the confusing state of public opinion. A 2002 public opinion poll
found that 50% of Croatians would not make friends with a homo-
sexual person, yet 39% supported same-sex marriage rights, and 41%
felt that LGBT rights were in danger. In 2005, 66% of hiring person-
nel at Croatian companies said they would not hire an openly gay
person. Jugovic, Pikic, and Bokan point out the disconnect between
attitudes towards homosexuality, which is seen as strongly negative,
and LGBT rights, which are seen as necessary.
Such a divide may be explained by the Croatian populace’s atti-
tude toward Europe and the EU. Unlike Serbia and Poland during
this same time period, there was no campaign to persuade Croatia of
the benefit of joining the EU because there was very little opposition
at the beginning of the 2000s – public opinion remained over 70%
in favor of joining the EU until the beginning of earnest accession
negotiations at the beginning of 2004 (Franc and Medugorac 2013).
Jelena Subotic (2011) sums up Croatian opinion thus: “Europe was
everything the Balkans were not: liberal, democratic, capitalist, pro-
gressive, and Catholic. It is this Europe that Croatia wanted to join.”
Europe and the European Union as an idea held tremendous sway in
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Croatia, and it is this attitude that may have influenced public per-
ception of LGBT rights.
As previously described, the number of LGBT activist groups in
Croatia boomed in the early 2000s. More than just the number of
groups, though, the capacity and willingness of LGBT activists to
hold public demonstrations also increased. The first Zagreb Pride
was held in 2002 in the face of violence from right-wing groups; how-
ever, police protection enabled the march to go on. Zagreb Pride
would be held annually throughout the 2000s, even in 2005 when a
disagreement among activist groups led to a change in leadership
(Butterfield 2013).
5.3 2005-2013 : candidacy
The political opportunity structure during the time period 2005-2013
was primarily determined by European Union conditionality, as Croa-
tian was an official candidate for EU accession during this time. In
terms of LGBT rights advances, the major development during Croa-
tia’s EU candidacy was the passage of an anti-discrimination law in
2007 that included sexual orientation as a protected class. The anti-
discrimination law in general had been promoted by the European
Union as necessary for EU accession, but early drafts did not include
provisions for LGBT citizens (Butterfield 2013). It was only through
intensive lobbying by LGBT rights groups such as the Team for Legal
Changes, Iskorak, and Lesbian Group Kontra, that sexual orientation
was added to the anti-discrimination law. While conditionality did
benefit the LGBT-rights movement somewhat in terms of putting the
anti-discrimination law on the table, it was the increased profession-
alization and lobbying prowess developed in the earlier half of the
decade that enabled the success of LGBT rights organizations.
5.4 2013-2015 : membership 40
Unlike in Serbia, there was not a framing contest in Croatia to deter-
mine the legitimacy of EU-provided frames, because the legitimacy of
the EU did not need to be proven – it was already popular as an idea
among Croatians. The popularity of EU accession did decline dur-
ing Croatia’s candidacy, but this was due to the frustration with the
length of the process and matters of Croatian sovereignty not related
to LGBT rights (Franc and Medugorac 2013).
Activist mobilization during Croatian EU candidacy continued apace,
but did not increase significantly; many groups founded during this
time quickly folded due to lack of membership (Butterfield 2013).
A major mobilizational event during this time period was the Split
Pride Parade in 2011, which faced violent opposition and was only
preserved through police intervention. However, Split Pride 2012 and
2013 saw increased participation, partly as a result of the successful
march in 2011 (Moss 2014; Gay March In Croatia Passes Without Incident
2012).
5.4 2013-2015 : membership
The two major political issues pertaining to LGBT rights in Croatia
post-accession were a 2013 amendment introduced to define marriage
as solely between a man and a woman, and a bill introduced just af-
ter the previous amendment took effect that granted same-sex part-
nerships all of the legal rights of heterosexual partnerships, except
for adoption rights (Vasilev 2016). The constitutional amendment,
backed by a group calling itself ”In the Name of the Family,” received
two-thirds of the popular vote in a referendum, despite prominent op-
position from the center-left government (Croatia Votes On Gay Mar-
riage 2013). Turnout was low for the vote, but it still appeared to
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present a popular repudiation of the efforts of LGBT activists of the
past 15 years.
However, the following year, the Croatian Parliament passed the
”Same Sex Life-Partnership Act” in response to the constitutional
amendment banning same-sex marriage1. This act gave LGBT part-
ners all rights of heterosexual couples, except for adoption2. In com-
pliance with EU freedom of movement standards, the law also recog-
nized same-sex partnerships from other EU countries3. The decision
by the Croatian Parliament to include such a provision is noteworthy
because the Croatian government continues to bring Croatian law in
compliance with EU regulations and law, even after accession, when
the leverage of conditionality is removed. Instead of active leverage
prompting same-sex partnership recognition, passive leverage of the
EU, such as the desire of the Croatian government to facilitate tourist
travel from other EU countries to Croatia4, drove the inclusion of the
cited provision. As the passage of the ”Same-Sex Life Partnership
Act” demonstrates, the EU continued to exert influence on Croatian
law concerning LGBT rights, even after accession.
In October 2013, the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and
Intersex Association Europe (ILGA-Europe) held their annual confer-
ence in Zagreb5. This conference was another indicator of the Croat-
ian government’s acceptance of LGBT rights in the post-accession pe-
1 Dan Bilepsky, ”Croatian Government to Pursue Law Allowing Civil Unions for Gay
Couples,” New York Times, Dec. 2, 2013.
2 However, the law provides for a partner to participate in kinship care for a child, which
”provides the partner with all parental rights towards a child, de facto placing him or her at
the same level as adoptive parent.”
Zagreb Pride. ”Croatian Parliament passed same sex Life-Partnership
Act”. http://www.ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/Attachments/
croatian-parliament-passed-the-life-partnership-act.pdf.
3 Ibid.
4 Tourism in Croatia is a strong example of what Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003)
term ”asymmetrical interdependence.” Croatia is more in need of the economic ben-
efit from increased EU tourism than EU citizens are of another vacation destination.
5 ”Washington: Advancing the Human Rights of LGBT Persons in Europe and Be-
yond.” US Official News. October 28, 2013 Monday . Date Accessed: 2016/03/14.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
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riod, as well as the strength of the Croatian LGBT-rights movement;
the conference was organized with full government support and the
participation of government officials and LGBT activist organizations
such as Kontra and Iskorak6. ILGA-Europe would also rank Croatia
the 5th-best country in Europe for gay rights in May 2015, ranking
better than the Netherlands, Spain, and Norway7.
5.5 summary
The development of the Croatian LGBT-rights movement is less clearly
consistent with the predictions of oppositional theory than the Ser-
bian LGBT-rights movement. While there does exist evidence of back-
lash leading to greater activist mobilization (e.g. Split Pride 2011, Za-
greb Pride 2002), on the whole the framing contests and anti-LGBT
mobilization present in the Serbian case did not exist in Croatia. In-
stead, a positive attitude of government officials and Croatian citi-
zens towards the EU, which was identified with LGBT rights, enabled
LGBT activism. Oppositional theory predicts that without significant
backlash, the Croatian LGBT-rights movement will not maintain its
strength after accession.
6 Ibid.
7 http://www.ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/Attachments/country_
ranking.png
6
A N A LY S I S
The major points of divergence between the predictions of basic Eu-
ropeanization theory and oppositional theory come from the non-
conditionality influenced components of the political process model:
issue framing and activist mobilization. Oppositional theory states
that LGBT-rights movements strengthen not just because of legal and
policy changes stemming from conditionality, but also due to changes
in issue framing and the ability of activists to mobilize. The Serbian
case provides positive examples of each component having signifi-
cant influence on LGBT-rights movement development. The framing
contests over ”European Serbia” were significant public events that
led to a predominance of a ”rights and representation” frame for
LGBT rights to replace the old ”illness and disease” frame, which al-
lowed activists greater freedom to pursue their work with public ac-
ceptance. The Serbian LGBT-rights movement also saw a cycle of anti-
LGBT violence and mobilization and responded with a correspond-
ing pro-LGBT activist mobilization that brought in groups that were
pro-Europe if not necessarily pro-LGBT initially. The lessons from
the Croatian case are less clear. There did not exist a public fram-
ing contest over Croatia’s European identity, because Europeaniza-
tion was already popular in Croatia. Similarly, the opposition to the
Croatian LGBT-rights movement was not anywhere near as harsh or
43
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institutionalized as in Serbia, and there exists only a little evidence
of a direct mobilizing response to opposition, from the Split Pride
parades. Oppositional theory would then predict a weaker Croatian
LGBT-rights movement than Serbian one after both countries join the
EU.
The cases of LGBT-rights movements in Serbia and Croatia may
thus follow the same trajectory of the LGBT-rights movements in
Poland and the Czech Republic analyzed by (O’Dwyer 2012, 2013).
In both Poland and Serbia, activists faced significant opposition, both
discursive and violent, but the LGBT movement gained strength through
it. Neither Croatia nor the Czech Republic had the same level of
opposition to LGBT rights activism as Poland or Serbia, and the
LGBT-rights movement in the Czech Republic evaporated shockingly
quickly after the passage of a same-sex partnerships law in 2006. It
remains to be seen whether or not the same fate will befall the Croa-
tian LGBT-rights movement following the institution of most rights
for same-sex partnerships in 2014.
7
C O N C L U S I O N
Analysis of extant social movements will inevitably weaken in the
face of new information, and the analysis of the Serbian and Croa-
tian LGBT-rights movements will surely change in the next decade,
which promises to be especially full of potentially impactful events.
Further movement of Serbia towards the EU and potential accession,
more Belgrade Pride parades, and adoption and same-sex marriage
rights for LGBT Croatians will all be contentious issues, the result
of which will shape the future of the LGBT-rights movements in the
two countries. What, then, does oppositional theory say about the fu-
ture? Based upon the relative strengths of the opposition in Croatia
and Serbia, the next few years should be much better for the Serbian
LGBT-rights movement than the Croatian one; although, given the
recent positive news for LGBT activists in both countries, it is unclear
if this will actually be the case.
Based upon the case studies presented in this thesis, the predictions
of oppositional theory are consistent with the historical record, and
hold greater explanatory power for the development of LGBT-rights
movements during the EU accession process in Serbia and Croatia than
basic Europeanization theory. The development of LGBT-rights move-
ments in Croatia and Serbia benefited not only from political changes
due to conditionality, but also from re-framing of LGBT issues and
mobilization of activists caused by backlash to the EU accession pro-
45
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cess. However, there is not enough of a historical record to prop-
erly evaluate how well oppositional theory explains the condition of
LGBT-rights movements in the case countries after they join the EU.
To test that, a longer-term study of the Croatian (and eventually Ser-
bian) case would be necessary; even in O’Dywer’s paradigmatic case
of the Czech Republic, a weakening of the LGBT-rights movement
there did not begin until a few years after accession.
This thesis addresses the gap in basic Europeanization theory cre-
ated by literature that focuses solely on conditionality. In doing so,
this literature neglects key causal mechanisms of change in LGBT-
rights movements. Backlash from anti-LGBT groups creates fram-
ing contests and counter-mobilization (i.e. pro-LGBT mobilization),
strengthening LGBT-right movements through pathways not predicted
by basic Europeanization theory. The case studies in this thesis strengthen
oppositional theory as an expansion of basic Europeanization the-
ory that incorporates additional understanding of how LGBT-rights
movements develop during the EU accession process.
8
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